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ESSAY: DISAPPEARING ACT: ARKANSAS’S CIRCULARLYDEFINED DEFAULT
Judge Victor A. Fleming
I. INTRODUCTION
“Dannie Danielson? Dannie Danielson. Is there a Dannie Danielson in
the courtroom?”
During my first few years on the bench, I developed the practice of
calling a person’s name three times before announcing that a failure-toappear (FTA) warrant would be issued. For twenty years, traffic cases were
all I handled. It seemed odd to me that the charge I saw more than any other
was not impaired driving, speeding, or inattention, but rather FTA.
Most people who monitor the administration of justice agree that FTA
is a significant problem in courts nationwide. This, in fact, was an observation in a 2011 report commissioned by the United States Department of Justice.1 From dealing with about 5,000 FTA defendants per year since 1997, I
can vouch for the fact that it is a problem in Pulaski County, Arkansas.
According to the records of Little Rock Traffic Court (now officially
known as Little Rock District Court–Second Division, a “department” of the
Thirty-First State District Court2) maintained by the Arkansas Administrative Office of the Courts, in a recent ten-year period (2009-2018), the court
in which I preside disposed of 224,182 citations.3 Those citations included



Judge, Little Rock District Court–Second Division; adjunct faculty member, William H.
Bowen School of Law. The author thanks Michael Pollock, Esq., for research assistance on
the earliest drafts of this article in 2017, at which time Mr. Pollock was a student at Bowen.
1. BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN ET AL., REDUCING COURTS’ FAILURE TO APPEAR RATE: A
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE APPROACH 1 (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
234370.pdf. This report, which examined the effectiveness of various written reminders to
reduce FTA rates in misdemeanor cases in fourteen Nebraska counties, concluded essentially
that reminders “significantly reduced FTA overall, and more substantive reminders were
significantly more effective than a simple reminder” and that people who do show up in court
tend to have a higher regard for the system than those who do not. Id. The concepts addressed
by that report are outside the scope of this essay.
2. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-17-1113(m)(1), (2)(B)(ii) (2019). Effective January 1,
2021, the Thirty-First District, which previously consisted of Pulaski County, will comprise
Pulaski and Perry Counties. It has twelve departments served by eight judges. Id. §§ 16-171113(m)(1)–(3).
3. Email letter from Syed Ameenuddin, Court Data Quality Analyst, Arkansas Administrative Office of the Courts, to Jessica Bennett, Court Administrator, Little Rock District
Court–Second Division (Sept. 30, 2019) (copy on file with UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW).

405

406

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

352,307 charges4 other than failure to appear, failure to pay,5 or failure to
comply with court orders.6 During that same time frame, the court disposed
of 50,352 charges of FTA.7 Do the math: On average, more than twenty
percent of citations dealt with included at least one charge of FTA.
I used to call FTA and its two “kissing cousins”—failure to pay8 and
failure to comply9—“the three F’s.” And, while I might be able to write a
book about my experiences in presiding over proceedings involving these
offenses, this essay is concerned only with FTA. The Arkansas General Assembly has enacted two laws that address FTA. One is contained in Title 5,
“Criminal Offenses,” and, aptly, defines an offense and stipulates sentences.
The other is contained in Title 16, “Practice, Procedure, and Courts,” and,
for the most part, empowers judges, beyond the sentencing provisions of
Title 5, to sanction those who do not show up in court after being duly notified to do so. In contrast, only one federal statute10 addresses FTA; it, of
course, is never applicable in state court.
In my view, Arkansas’s statutory law regarding FTA should be amended. One statute ought to be enough, and it should set forth, in easilyunderstandable language, what FTA is and how it is to be punished. The
federal statute on the topic is instructive and could perhaps be considered in
the amendment process.
II. STATE V. DANIELSON, LARGE ROCK DISTRICT COURT
Let’s begin with a hypothetical, in a fictional court, that might serve to
illustrate how FTA often comes into play in a relatively simple traffic case.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-701–703 (2019).
See id. § 16-10-108(a)(3) (2019).
Ameenuddin, supra note 3.
See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-701–703 (2019).
See id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (2019).
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On January 1, 2019, Dannie Danielson receives an electronic citation11
(“the Ticket”). She is charged with a violation of Arkansas Code Annotated
section 27-51-104, which is captioned “Careless and prohibited driving.”
The Ticket reads in part as follows:
Court Appearance Information
LARGE ROCK D.C.
600 MARKED MAN ST
LARGE ROCK, AR 77777

Date
01/23/2019

Time
9:00 AM

Defendant must appear in court at said time and place or otherwise
comply with the provisions of this complaint and instructions of the
NOTICE part of this ticket.
NO SIGNATURE REQUIRED
Pursuant to §27-50-60312
A.

The Arraignment FTA

On January 23, 2019, court is called to order in the Large Rock District
Court (LRDC) courtroom at 8:30 a.m. Dannie’s case is among those that are
called. Dannie is not present. When court concludes at 11:30 a.m., Dannie
has not been seen. To the observation of the judge, and other court officials,
Dannie has not been present at any time during the court’s session. No letters or pleadings have been received from her or from anyone on her behalf.
So, now what happens? First, we must ask what law or laws apply.
Section 5-54-120 of the Arkansas Code reads:
(a) As used in this section, “pending charge” means a charge that results
from an arrest or issuance of a citation or criminal summons, or after
the filing of a criminal information or indictment and that has not
been resolved by acquittal, conviction, dismissal, or nolle prosequi.13

11. A “citation” is a “written order or electronic ticket issued by a law enforcement
officer . . . requiring a person accused of violating the law to appear in a designated court or
governmental office at a specified date and time.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-10-202(1) (2019).
An “electronic ticket” is “an electronic citation or warning printed by a law enforcement
officer and issued to a person accused of violating the law.” Id. § 16-10-202(3).
12. Section 27-50-603(d)(2) of the Arkansas Code provides that “If issued an electronic
citation,” a defendant “acknowledges receipt of the notice to appear in court and gives his or
her promise to appear in court by acceptance of the electronic citation.” Id. § 27-50603(d)(2).
13. Act 322 of the 2019 General Assembly (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-120(a)
(2019)) amended the definition of pending charge in this statute. Act 538 of 2015 had defined pending charge as one “that results from an arrest or after the filing of [sic] a criminal
information or indictment and that has not been resolved . . . .” The 2019 amendment inserted
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(b) A person commits the offense of failure to appear if he or she fails to
appear without reasonable excuse subsequent to having been:
(1) Cited or summonsed as an accused; or
(2) Lawfully set at liberty upon condition that he or she appear
at a specified time, place, and court.14

Subsection (c) then classifies FTA on an irregularly sliding scale: FTA
on a violation is a Class C misdemeanor.15 On a Class B or C misdemeanor,
FTA is a Class B misdemeanor.16 On a Class A misdemeanor, FTA is a
Class A misdemeanor.17 For an unclassified misdemeanor, FTA is an “unclassified misdemeanor with the same penalty.”18 For felonies, FTA is either
a Class B or C felony, depending on whether or not a probation revocation is
involved.19 This section concludes by stipulating that none of the above applies “to an order to appear imposed as a condition of suspension or probation under § 5-4-303.”20
Perhaps this irregularly structured approach to punishment for those
found guilty of FTA has some basis in logic. However, in over twenty-three
years of working with this law, I have not been able to figure it out. It’s confusing.
In the case of misdemeanors, which are all I deal with where sentencing is concerned, I would recommend that the penalty range be analogous to
a Class-A misdemeanor. That is, a fine of up to $1,000, imprisonment of up
to one year, or both.21 In felony cases, I’d recommend a similar approach,
with a harsher range: a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $10,000,
imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than ten years, or both.
I would recommend that FTA not be classified with a letter designation
or even that it be called a misdemeanor or felony. I would simply spell out
the language “or issuance of a citation or criminal summons,” along with a comma, between
arrest and or. Apparently, the drafters of the 2015 definition overlooked that, in district court,
lots of folks manage to get court dates without there having been an arrest, an information, or
an indictment. Both the 2015 and the 2019 measures are afflicted with a lack of parallelism.
As I see it, subsection (a) should read, in pertinent part, “a charge that results from an arrest,
from the issuance of a citation or criminal summons, or from the filing of a criminal information or indictment and that has not been resolved . . . .” Which is to say that there are three
causes of a pending charge, each described [preposition] [article] [noun]—i.e., with appropriate parallelism.
14. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-54-120(a)–(b) (2019).
15. Id. § 5-54-120(c)(7) (2019).
16. Id. §§ 5-54-120(c)(4), (5) (2019).
17. Id. § 5-54-120(c)(6) (2019).
18. Id. § 5-54-120(c)(3) (2019).
19. Id. §§ 5-54-120(c)(1), (2) (2019).
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-120(d) (2019).
21. Id. § 5-54-120(c)(6) (2019).
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the possible punishment. This would give the trier of fact considerable latitude to determine the relative seriousness of the offense on a case-by-case
basis.
Another provision that may apply, eleven titles further in, is section 1617-131, which provides:
(a) A person required to appear before a district court in this state, having been served with any form of notice to appear for any criminal
offense, traffic violation, or misdemeanor charge, shall appear at the
time and place designated in the notice. 22
(b)(1) If a person fails to appear as required in subsection (a) of this section, the presiding judge may suspend the person’s driver’s license.
(2) The license shall be suspended until the person appears and completes the sentence ordered by the court.
(3) After the person satisfies all requirements of the sentence, the Department of Finance and Administration shall assess the current fees
for reinstatement of a driver’s license. 23

Suspending the driver’s license (DL) of one who does not show up for
court is permissible but not mandatory.24 Nonetheless, pursuant to standard
LRDC procedure, a warrant is issued, charging Dannie with failure to appear (FTA) under section 5-54-120, and her license is suspended.
B.

The Plea Bargain

A few days after an FTA warrant was issued, Dannie appears with
counsel in LRDC. She has not yet been arraigned on the original charge of
careless and prohibited driving, a violation punishable by a fine of up to
$100.25 And now, in addition to that, she faces a charge of FTA—a Class C
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $500, plus up to thirty days in
jail.26 She has the right, of course, to plead not guilty to both charges.
Further compounding the issue is that Dannie was issued an electronic
citation. Differently than was the case for many years before enactment of

22. A circular definition (see note 31, infra) provides that one who is required to appear, because she was served with a notice to appear, shall appear. Why section 5-54-120 is
not mentioned I cannot say.
23. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-131 (2019). Issues involved with DL suspension and reinstatement are outside the scope of this essay. In many courts, it is routine procedure to suspend a defendant’s DL each time he or she fails to show up in court.
24. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-131(b)(1) (2019).
25. Id. § 27-51-104(c).
26. Id. § 5-4-201(b)(3); id. § 5-4-401(b)(3).
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the statute authorizing electronic citations,27 Dannie’s signature does not
appear beneath the words “I promise to appear in court . . . .” Whether and
to what extent the legislature viewed this aspect of the statute as problematical, I cannot say, but section 27-50-603(d) shows that there was at least
some awareness of the issue:
(1) If issued a written citation, the arrested person in order to secure release, as provided in this section, must give his or her written promise
so to appear in court by signing in duplicate the written notice prepared by the arresting officer . . . .
(2) If issued an electronic citation, the arrested person in order to secure
release, as provided in this section, acknowledges receipt of the notice to appear in court and gives his or her promise to appear in court
by acceptance of the electronic citation. 28

Assuming we can get past the issue of Dannie’s being an arrested person, how are we to determine whether Dannie accepted the citation? Law
enforcement officers who issue citations are typically not present for arraignments, and prosecutors have few, if any, details at hand about the case
at that stage of a proceeding. Thus, the issue of whether Dannie accepted the
citation for the primary charge looms. If she did not accept the citation,
where does that put us?
A Class C misdemeanor being punishable by incarceration,29 it is not
unreasonable to think that Dannie—as well as thousands of others in her
shoes—will exercise the right to remain silent at arraignment, as her defense
counsel takes the position that there is a Due Process issue as to notice of the
date, time, and place of the first court date. While some electronic citations
mirror the hypothetical prototype set forth above, others do call for a signature.30 “Acceptance” is not a defined term in the statute. Questions that
might arise in the courtroom include:

27. Id. § 27-50-601 et seq.
28. Id. § 27-50-603(d).
29. See id. §§ 5-4-201(b)(3), 5-4-401(b)(3).
30. In my experience, it is not uncommon for a citation, electronic or otherwise, to contain some erroneous data. A frequent item that is input inaccurately is the arraignment date
and time. Court staff is trained to look for this, and clerks send a letter to defendants with the
correct date and time. Notice so sent is only as good as the address to which it is sent. In my
observation, a disproportionate percentage of people who do not show up in court as and
when called for in a letter sent to them by the court will, when offering reasons for their absence, cite address issues. E.g., frequently, the address on the citation—and, therefore, the
address to which the court sent the letter—is not where they live now. No, they typically do
not know that Arkansas law calls for them to notify the State when they change addresses.
Yes, they were certainly going to get this fixed when the time came to renew their licenses.
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Whether physical receipt of a copy of an electronic citation constitutes acceptance under all circumstances;
 Whether the citation ceases to be electronic if it is printed out on a
piece of paper; and
 If the preceding issue is answered yes, whether a written promise to
appear is then required to convict someone of FTA.
These issues have been omnipresent in my courtroom since the onset of
electronic citations, and have not yet been litigated in a full adversarial proceeding.
As with all criminal offenses, the burden of proof on the FTA charge
lies with the prosecution. If a defendant pleads not guilty to FTA, then the
prosecution must be prepared to prove all elements of the offense. What,
then, are the elements of FTA? In addressing FTA, the Arkansas General
Assembly has given the State a classical circular definition.31 The words
“fails” and “appear” are parts of the definition:
(b) A person commits the offense of failure to appear if he or she fails to
appear without reasonable excuse subsequent to having been:
(1) Cited or summonsed as an accused; or
(2) Lawfully set at liberty upon condition that he or she appear
at a specified time, place, and court.32

So, literally, this law says that a person commits “failure to appear” if
he or she fails to appear. In fairness to the law-writers, though, the statute
also provides that the subject’s absence must be lacking a legitimate reason.
Despite the circuitousness, perhaps we may identify the elements of the offense:
(1) The person has been properly “cited” or “summonsed;”
(2) The citing or summonsing has occurred in a criminal context—that
is, the person must have received the citation or summons “as an
accused;” or
(1) The person has been “lawfully set at liberty”
(2) On the condition that he or she show up at a specified “time, place,
and court”; and
31. This practice is frowned upon by those who instruct on how to write definitions. See
PURDUE ONLINE WRITING LAB, Writing Definitions, https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/
general_writing/common_writing_assignments/definitions.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2019)
(“Do not define a word by mere repetition or merely restating the word.”).
32. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-120(b) (2019).
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(3) The person does not show up in court as she was cited or summonsed to do, or as she was supposed to do as a condition of being
lawfully set at liberty.
In my opinion, those three elements are clear. But now we must consider and deal with element number 4:
(4) The person’s not showing up is not due to circumstances recognized
by law as superseding the obligation created by the citation, summons, or conditional release.33
In essence, FTA, in the criminal context, is not being physically present
where and when one has been lawfully ordered to be physically present unless one has a reason that the law will recognize as “reasonable” for the absence. And what a term “reasonable excuse”34 is! Nowhere does the Code
define it or either of its component parts.35
The issue of whether one who does not show up for court has what the
law will recognize as a reasonable justification for her absence is an unusual
and separate issue. Once the first three elements are proved, or admitted,
must the defense then somehow get into the record the reason she was not
there when she was supposed to be? If not, is the State’s proof of notice and
non-appearance sufficient to carry the day? It is clear from federal jurisprudence that notice and non-appearance, standing alone, are not sufficient to
convict for FTA. But the analogous federal statute differs from the Arkansas
statute by its use of the word “knowingly.”36
Given the terminology “without reasonable excuse,” the prosecution
should do something to communicate to the court that there has been no
communication from the defendant to the court regarding an excuse, if that
is the case. If the defendant has in some manner communicated an excuse to
either the court or the prosecution, then some showing should be made rela33. That’s my definitional description of “without reasonable excuse.”
34. A discussion of the term “reasonable excuse,” as interpreted in a different context
may be found in an unrelated case from another jurisdiction, in which the judge opined:
[T]he “reasonable excuse” standard . . . continues to be elusive because its application is largely dependent on the particularities of each case. Courts have found
that ignorance of the law, operating under the impression that the issue could be
resolved without litigation, failure to retain or effectively communicate with
counsel, counsel’s own negligence or delay in complying with the [law], ongoing
medical treatment, and injuries that do not hinder the claimant’s ability to communicate with others, are not, by themselves, sufficient to support a finding of
“reasonable excuse.”
Faulknor v. Virgin Islands, 60 V.I. 65, 76 (Super. Ct. 2014) (footnotes and citations omitted).
35. “Reasonable” is a defined term in Rule 1.0 of the Arkansas Code of Professional
Responsibility, but the analogy is hardly apt.
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1) (2019).
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tive to its credibility if the prosecutor disbelieves it or as to its reasonableness if the prosecutor is prepared to accept what the defendant offers as true.
The point is that element four of the offense cannot be ignored.37 The
prosecution must prove the first three elements with affirmative proof and,
as to element four, somehow demonstrate either that the defendant has never
explained why he was absent or that the defendant’s proffered excuse is not
of such a caliber as to excuse the absence. It is up to the court then to determine whether the excuse is reasonable, and that will almost always require
some degree of evidence and testimony.
In some circumstances, it may be deemed by a court that, after the
prosecution proves (1) proper notice to the defendant; (2) the defendant’s
absence; and (3) no contemporaneously-communicated excuse, a presumption has arisen that element four has been established prima facie. Some
presentation from the defense is then needed to rebut the presumption with
some excuse. If the defense rebuts the presumption, the burden then shifts
back to the prosecution to challenge the excuse as not being reasonable.
Obviously, these are issues for the trier of fact to take up.
There is not much state case law on this issue. In Clark v. State,38 a jury
conviction of the appellant Clark for failure to appear was reversed. The
salient fact was that, in an order granting a continuance, the trial was reset to
a date certain (March 11, 2014), but was “conspicuously void of a specified
time.”39 Court had convened at 8:30 a.m. The judge released the jury at 9:00
a.m. Clark arrived about 9:05, with a long and colorful story regarding how
and why he had run late. The appellate court found that there was not “substantial evidence that Clark was informed of the specific time of his trial.”40
In an earlier case, Harris v. State,41 the court held that when a defendant was present with counsel at arraignment where a trial date, in which no
start-time was mentioned, was announced, Due Process was not violated by
charging him with FTA. The record therein reflected, though, that, as the
trial date approached, neither defense counsel nor the sheriff nor the bail
bondsman could locate Harris. And Harris’s stated reason at trial for not

37. The federal counterpart to this reasonable excuse standard is uncontrollable circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (c) (2019).
38. 2015 Ark. App. 142, 457 S.W.3d 305.
39. Id. at 6, 457 S.W.3d at 309.
40. Id. at 5–6, 457 S.W.3d at 309 (“Corporal Fyte testified that he encountered Clark on
the elevator around 9:05 a.m. on March 11; that Clark was hurrying to get to court and told
Fyte that he (Clark) was late; that, on his way, Clark told his sister to alert people at court that
he was running late; and that Fyte made sure Clark got to the court door. Clark testified to the
same events. He added that he had thought trial was at 9:00 a.m.; he drove to the nearby town
of Winslow at 5:00 a.m. to shower at a friend’s house because he (Clark) had no water; his
truck became stuck in the snow; and he phoned his sister, who was already at court.”).
41. 6 Ark. App. 89, 638 S.W.2d 698 (1982).
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showing up on his original trial date was that he thought the charges were
going to be dropped.42
In Atkins v. State,43 the Supreme Court reversed a burglary conviction
with a ten-year sentence while affirming a conviction for failure to appear
with a four-year sentence. Atkins claimed he was advised by his lawyer not
to show up for his first sentencing hearing on the burglary charge. 44 Justice
Newbern’s take on this was that “[e]ven if Atkins had proven conclusively
that he was advised by his lawyer not to appear, it is our opinion his failure
to appear . . . would not have been excused. He is arguing he committed this
crime because his lawyer told him to, and thus his conviction should be vacated because his lawyer was [therefore] ineffective.”45
Thus, the FTA case law is not definitively helpful on the issue of how
this concept of “reasonable excuse” comes into play procedurally. And that
may be a primary reason for FTAs being treated as they are treated on a dayto-day basis in high-volume courts.
In my high-volume traffic court, ninety percent of all cases are resolved
by plea bargains.46 This includes the numerous cases in which a defendant is
charged with FTA. I would venture that closer to 99% of all FTA charges
are resolved via plea bargain.
When a defendant comes in shortly after an arraignment FTA has been
issued, the prosecution will almost always recommend dismissal of the FTA
if the defendant is willing to plead guilty to the underlying primary charge—
especially if there is a Due Process notice issue because of an electronic
citation’s not containing a written promise to appear. In Little Rock Traffic
Court, the majority of FTA charges are resolved by dismissal when there is
only one offense. Where there is more than one FTA in one case, a nocontest plea for a stipulated fine to one, with a dismissal of others, is often
approved as part of a plea agreement.
I almost never sit as the trier of fact in an actual hearing on whether an
excuse for not showing up is reasonable. That said, the excuses I’ve heard
over time include being in another court on another case, waiting in the
wrong courtroom in the same building, having to deal with an unexpected
illness or death, getting one’s “days mixed-up” or other phraseology that
suggests a scheduling error, not being able to get off work, forgetting, not
having transportation, having transportation issues while traveling toward
the courthouse, losing one’s job, and moving out of town or out of state. No,
42. Harris v. State, 6 Ark. App. 89, 91–92, 638 S.W.2d 698, 699 (1982).
43. 287 Ark. 445, 701 S.W.2d 109 (1985).
44. Id. at 447, 701 S.W.2d at 110.
45. Id.
46. “In cases in which it appears that it would serve the interests of the public in the
effective administration of justice, the prosecuting attorney may engage in plea discussions
for the purpose of reaching a plea agreement.” ARK. R. CRIM. P. 25.1(a).
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the reasons are not always logically related to the offense. Yes, if everyone
who failed to appear was convicted and sentenced to even a short term in
jail, there would not be enough jail space.
In Dannie’s case, a plea of no contest is accepted to the traffic offense.
She is fined $100. The FTA is dismissed. And the court orders her DL to be
reinstated without fee, as she was not convicted of the FTA charge.
III. THE TWO ARKANSAS FTAS
For the next few paragraphs, I will refer to a violation of Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-54-120(b) as a “Title 5 FTA” and a violation of Ark. Code Ann. §
16-17-131 as a “Title 16 FTA.” One might rationally ask whether a Title 16
FTA is independent of, and separate from, its Title 5 counterpart, and
whether the elements of a Title 5 FTA are inherent in its Title 16 counterpart.
Within a Title 16 FTA is the provision that if the presiding judge suspends the DL of the FTA subject, then the license shall remain suspended
“until the person appears.”47 This suggests that the court is authorized to
suspend the license before the subject is convicted of the charge of FTA.
The subsection’s latter clause—providing that the license suspension continues until sentence is completed—implies that the suspension continues
until a finding of guilt or innocence on the charge of FTA. If the finding is
guilty, then the suspension is to continue until the FTA sentence is completed. But if the finding is not guilty, then logic dictates that the suspension be
lifted.
There is no case law applicable to this section to provide guidance. But
if the defendant is not convicted of FTA, she therefore has no sentence to
serve for that offense. The term “sentence” logically cannot apply unless
and until the person is convicted. Given the concept of a conviction, the inescapable logic is that the Title 5 FTA is necessarily the charge for which
the conviction stands. After all, Title 5 is subtitled “Criminal Offenses,” and
Title 16, by contrast, is subtitled “Practice, Procedure, and Courts.”
One might question the propriety of the legislature’s inclusion of language in the Title 16 FTA statute that effectively adds punishment to the
sentencing possibilities under the Title 5 FTA: DL suspension is not per se
authorized as part of a sentence for a Title 5 FTA. But that issue is outside
the scope of this essay. Moreover, while this essay does not address DL suspension and reinstatement, it seems to me that a DL reinstatement fee is to
be charged only when a license is suspended as part of a sentence.48
47. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-131(b)(2) (2019).
48. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-808(a) (2019) currently provides that the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration Office of Driver Services “shall charge a fee . . . for
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Under the Title 5 FTA definition, one would think, only following a
trial in which a defendant’s proffered reasoning for not showing up was addressed, and determined by the court not to be reasonable—or a knowing
and intelligent waiver of one’s right to such a trial has been received by the
trial court—would a defendant have a sentence due to a conviction for FTA.
The Title 16 FTA language allows a presiding judge to suspend a person’s DL preliminarily (perhaps for the purpose of incentivizing the defendant to get herself into court quickly following the FTA) and to leave the suspension in place following a conviction until sentence is served. If there is
no sentence ordered for the FTA—because the defendant was not convicted
of the charge—then, the DL suspension should be lifted.49 While the law
does not specify that the conviction must be for FTA,50 it does seem clear
from context that such conviction should either be for a Title 5 FTA, for a
moving traffic violation under Ark. Code Ann. § 27-50-306, or for any other
offense for which DL suspension is authorized or imposed.51
In summary, Arkansas’s criminal law on FTA makes it illegal to not
show up in court without a reasonable excuse. The term reasonable excuse
is not defined and has not been directly interpreted in applicable case law.
Permissible sentences follow an irregularly sliding scale, dependent upon
the severity of the underlying offenses. Available punishments for FTA as
set forth in the Title 5 FTA law run the gamut from a fine of up to $500 plus
jail time of up to 30 days (Class C Misdemeanor)52 to a fine of up to $15,000
plus 5–15 years in prison (Class B Felony).53 And Title 16 permits preliminary suspension of DL for failure to appear, based on a non-express standard
reinstating a driver’s license suspended because of a conviction for violation of any offense”
(emphasis added).
49. The relevant section provides:
The reinstatement fee under this section shall be calculated by multiplying one
hundred dollars ($100) by each separate occurrence of offenses under any other
provision of the law resulting in:
(i) A court order directing the office to suspend the driving privileges of the person; or
(ii) The [ODS’s] entering a suspension order.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-808(c)(1)(A).
50. Again, the statute directs assessment of “a fee . . . for reinstating a driver’s license
suspended because of a conviction for violation of any offense.” Id. § 27-16-808(a) (emphasis
added).
51. Other statutes that authorize, or automatically impose, DL suspension, either as part
of a sentence or as part of a pre-conviction administrative sanction, include ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 5-36-120 (theft of motor fuel); 5-54-125 (fleeing); 5-65-104 (driving or boating while
intoxicated); 5-65-204 (underage driving or boating under the influence); 5-65-304 and 310
(refusal to submit to chemical testing); 5-65-402(d)(2)(B) in tandem with 3-3-203(e) (purchase of possession by minor); 5-27-503(d)(3) (possession of fraudulent ID card).
52. Id. §§ 5-4-201(b)(3), 5-4-401(b)(3).
53. Id. §§ 5-4-201(a)(1), 5-4-401(a)(4).
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of proof, directing that the suspension shall, if the judge declares it, remain
in effect until some sentence is completed.
IV. FTA IN FEDERAL COURT
While not altogether without flaws, the treatment of FTA in the United
States Code is direct, straightforward, to the point, and, relatively speaking,
easy to understand. Before the basic FTA section54 in the Code are several
sections that expressly deal with situations in which a person might be ordered conditionally released.55
Judges, plus a few other officials, “before whom an arrested person is
brought”56 or before whom a convicted person stands “shall order that such
person be released or detained”57 pending trial, sentencing, or appeal.58 18
U.S.C. § 3142 specifically speaks to the authority of trial courts to release
defendants pending trial. This section contains over 2,800 words, none of
which touch on the issue of informing the defendant of the day, date, and
time of the defendant’s trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3143 addresses the issue of releasing convicted defendants pending appeal. Interestingly, the court is to lean
heavily in favor of detaining those who have been found guilty.59
And then there is 18 U.S.C. § 3146, titled “Penalty for failure to appear.” In it Congress does not define, circularly or otherwise, what failure to
appear means. Instead, it just seems clear, from its wording, that it is only
going to apply to people who knew where they were supposed to be and
when:
(a) Offense.—Whoever, having been released under this chapter knowingly—
(1) fails to appear before a court as required by the conditions of release; or
(2) fails to surrender for service of sentence pursuant to a court order;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

54. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (2019).
55. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3145.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3141(a).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3141(a)–(b).
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3142.
59. Language to the effect that the subject is to be detained unless, among other things,
“the judicial officers finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to
flee” appears twice. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(a)(1), 3143(a)(2)(B), 3143(b)(2)(A) (2019).
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(b) Punishment.—(1) The punishment for an offense under this section
is—
(A) if the person was released in connection with a charge of, or
while awaiting sentence, surrender for service of sentence, or appeal or certiorari after conviction for—
(i) an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or
imprisonment for a term of 15 years or more, a fine under this title60 or imprisonment for not more than ten
years, or both;
(ii) an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of
five years or more, a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both;
(iii) any other felony, a fine under this title or imprisonment
for not more than two years, or both; or
(iv) a misdemeanor, a fine under this title or imprisonment
for not more than one year, or both; and
(B) if the person was released for appearance as a material witness, a
fine under this chapter or imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both.
(2) A term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be consecutive to the sentence of imprisonment for any other offense.
(c) Affirmative defense.—It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution
under this section that uncontrollable circumstances prevented the
person from appearing or surrendering, and that the person did not
contribute to the creation of such circumstances in reckless disregard
of the requirement to appear or surrender, and that the person appeared or surrendered as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3571, titled “Sentence of fine,” provides, in subsection (a) that one “who
has been found guilty of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine.” Subsection (b), covering
“Fines for Individuals,” provides:
Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, an individual who has been
found guilty of an offense may be fined not more than the greatest of—
(1) the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense;
(2) the applicable amount under subsection (d) of this section;
(3) for a felony, not more than $250,000;
(4) for a misdemeanor resulting in death, not more than $250,000;
(5) for a Class A misdemeanor that does not result in death, not more than
$100,000;
(6) for a Class B or C misdemeanor that does not result in death, not more than
$5,000; or
(7) for an infraction, not more than $5,000.
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(d) Declaration of forfeiture.—If a person fails to appear before a court
as required, and the person executed an appearance bond pursuant to
section 3142(b) of this title or is subject to the release condition set
forth in clause (xi) or (xii) of section 3142(c)(1)(B) of this title, the
judicial officer may, regardless of whether the person has been
charged with an offense under this section, declare any property designated pursuant to that section to be forfeited to the United States. 61

The terms and conditions that may be found in federal conditional release orders is addressed at length in 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (and are beyond the
scope of this essay). The word knowingly in 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) is significant and, arguably at least, provides one of two primary defenses to federal
bail-jumping, the other being the affirmative defense of uncontrollable circumstances contemplated by subsection (c).
The key to convicting a person for failure to appear is adequate notice
to the person of what is expected of her—that is, when to show up and
where. A 1979 case62 originating in California indicates that there are five
elements in the federal FTA: (1) that the defendant was released; (2) that the
defendant was required to appear in court, (3) that the defendant was aware
of the required appearance; (4) that the defendant failed to appear as required; and (5) that the defendant was willful in his or her failure to appear.63
In United States v. Ott,64 an Eighth Circuit case that originated in Arkansas, Ms. Ott was found guilty of failure to appear and sentenced to one
year and one day in prison. She had been indicted on charges of forging and
uttering savings bonds in the Eastern District of Arkansas. She was arrested
in Florida and there brought before a United States Magistrate Judge, who
“released Ott on her personal recognizance after advising her verbally and in
writing to report for arraignment to the United States Magistrate in Little
Rock, Arkansas, at 10:00 a.m. on July 26, 1983.”65 The Magistrate Judge in
Florida also told Ms. Ott to “reside at her parents’ home in Little Rock pending final disposition of the charges” and advised her on the record that “failure to comply with these directions could subject her to separate criminal
penalties.”66 She did not show up for her arraignment. She could not be
reached at her parents’ home following the date of her arraignment. And the
evidence was that she had not tried to contact court officials “before or after

61.
62.
(1980).
63.
64.
65.
66.

18 U.S.C. § 3146.
United States v. McGill, 604 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035
Id. at 1254.
741 F.2d 226, 226 (8th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 227.
Id.
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her nonappearance.”67 This evidence was found “to justify the inference that
defendant’s failure to appear was willful.”68
At the other end of the spectrum, it is clear from several federal cases
that mere proof of a defendant’s absence, standing alone, is not sufficient to
establish a willful failure to appear. In United States v. James,69 for instance,
James was cited by the United States Park police for speeding and driving
without a license. A magistrate released him on $100 bail and set a trial
date. James appeared for trial and requested a continuance, which was
granted. At the next setting, James was absent, but the prosecution received
a continuance. “After several unsuccessful attempts to locate [James], he
was found and advised of the new trial date.”70 (The opinion does not say
how this notice was served.)
Again, James did not appear for trial, and a bench warrant was issued
for his arrest. An additional complaint was filed charging him with failure to
appear . . . .”71 Months later, James was arrested in the District of Columbia,
his case was “removed” to Maryland, and bail was set at $2,500, which he
could not make, so he was incarcerated until trial. He was found not guilty
of speeding, but guilty of driving without a license and FTA in front of a
magistrate. For FTA, he was sentenced to a year in jail, with eleven months
suspended. On appeal to the U.S. District Court, it was found that “the record before the Court in the case at bar casts no light on whether James’ failure to appear was willful. It does not indicate why he failed to appear; it
shows only that the Defendant was notified of the new trial date, but failed
to present himself on the appointed day. A conviction based solely on this
record would require reversal because it would not be supported by substantial evidence.”72 There was a further complication in that the magistrate
over-participated in the trial, as there was no prosecuting attorney.73 But the
gist of it is that the prosecution must prove willfulness by something other
than notice and non-appearance.
V. CONCLUSION
There are over 100 district courts in Arkansas. I preside over one of
them. I know that many of my colleagues see FTAs as often as I do. Considering the frequency, the pervasiveness, and the seriousness of this charge, it
deserves ongoing attention from the Arkansas General Assembly. Weak67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 228.
Id. at 229.
440 F. Supp. 1137 (D. Md. 1977).
Id. at 1138.
Id.
Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1140.
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nesses and vulnerability ought to be addressed; ambiguities ought to be
eliminated; clarity and respect for the Rule of Law ought to be the goals.
The current state of FTA law in Arkansas is unnecessarily complex and
confusing. A plethora of issues beg to be resolved:
 What notice should be required before one may be charged with
failure to appear?
 Is the absence of a reasonable excuse an element of the offense for
the prosecution to prove? Or is it an affirmative defense to be raised
by the defendant?
 What punishment is really appropriate, especially in an atmosphere
where jail space is sparse?
And there are more.
The new law should be contained in a single title of the Arkansas Code,
and not contain circular definitions. The federal FTA statute should be used
as a model for the General Assembly when they redraft Arkansas FTA law.
In my opinion, the legislature should ensure that all citations contain a written promise to appear, calling for a signature by the recipient.
In Appendix A, I offer a draft of a statute that I believe would be a
good starting point toward resolving the issues that I have discussed in this
essay.
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APPENDIX A:
AN ACT REGARDING THE OFFENSE OF FAILURE TO APPEAR
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
STATE OF ARKANSAS:
SECTION 1. Arkansas Code § 5–54–120, concerning the criminal offense of Failure to Appear, is amended to read in its entirety as follows:
(a) Offense. The offense of failure to appear—that is, not being physically present at the place, on the date, and at the time designated in legal
process properly served upon an individual—is punishable as stated
herein.
(b) Legal process. The legal process upon which a charge of failure to
appear may be based includes, but is not limited to, appearance
agreements, citations, court orders, subpoenas, summonses, warrants,
writs, and any other legal documents used by courts and law enforcement agencies to compel the appearance of defendants and witnesses to appear at arraignments, depositions, court hearings of any
sort, sentencings, trials, depositions, or other commonly recognized
proceedings related to the judicial process in criminal cases.
(c) Punishment. Whoever, being required by legal process to appear on
a certain date at a certain time in a certain court, or other designated
location for any proceeding in a criminal case contemplated by this
section, knowingly commits the offense of failure to appear shall be
punished as provided in this subsection.
(1) The punishment for an offense under this section is as follows:
(A) If the required appearance was in regard to a pending
charge or disposition of a felony, either before or after
a determination of guilt, then failure to appear is punishable by a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than
$10,000, imprisonment of not less than one year nor
more than ten years, or both.
(i) If the required appearance was in regard to an order to appear issued by a court of competent jurisdiction before a revocation hearing under § 16-93307 and the defendant was placed on probation or
received a suspended sentence for a felony, then
failure to appear is punishable a fine of not less
than $1,000 nor more than $10,000, imprisonment
of not less than one year nor more than ten years,
or both.
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(ii) If the required appearance was in regard to a pending charge or disposition of any misdemeanor, either before or after a determination of guilt, then
failure to appear is punishable by a fine of up to
$1,000, imprisonment of up to one year, or both.
(B) If the person was released for appearance as a material witness, the failure to appear is punishable by a fine of up to
$1,000, imprisonment of up to one year, or both.
(C) If the person was subpoenaed as a witness other than a material witness, then failure to appear is punishable by a fine
of up to $1,000, imprisonment of up to one year, or both.

(d) A term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be consecutive to the sentence of imprisonment for any other offense in regard
to which a defendant is sentenced in connection with the proceedings
to which the failure-to-appear charge relates.
(e) Affirmative defense. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that uncontrollable circumstances prevented the person from appearing or surrendering, and that the person did not contribute to the creation of such circumstances in reckless disregard of
the requirement to appear or surrender, and that the person appeared
or surrendered as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist.
(f) Declaration of forfeiture. If a person fails to appear before a court as
required, and the person executed an appearance bond, a signature
bond, or a surety bond, the judicial officer may, regardless of whether
the person has been charged with an offense under this section, declare any property of the defendant pledged in connection therewith
forfeited to the State and commence such forfeiture proceedings as
may be deemed appropriate against any sureties.
SECTION 2. Arkansas Code § 16-17-131, concerning presiding judges’
authorization to sanction certain persons failing to appear in court, is
amended to read in its entirety as follows:
If a person who has been duly served with notice contemplated by Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-54-120 to appear in court for any criminal offense—
including traffic and non-traffic violations, misdemeanors, and felonies—for arraignment, pre- or post-trial hearings, trial, sentencing, or
any other judicial proceeding—shall fail to appear on the date, at the
time, and at the place designated in the notice, the presiding judge may
forthwith charge the individual with a failure to appear, a violation of §
5-54-120; issue a warrant for the immediate arrest and detention of the
individual; direct expedited service of such warrant by whatever lawful
means are available under the circumstances; and order the Department
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of Finance and Administration Office of Driver Services to take such
administrative action as may be appropriate to modify, suspend, or revoke the defendant’s driving privileges based upon such statutes, rules,
and regulations as may be applicable under the circumstances.

